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INTRODUCTION 
A certain debate in financial economics centers on the idea of predictability in 
financial markets. It is a battle between those who subscribe to the idea of efficiency and 
those who proclaim the markets to be inefficient. Numerous anomalies in the system have 
been championed as proof of inefficiency and subsequently proven to be matters of 
chance. It is not the purpose of this paper to prove one theory over the other; it suggests a 
more macro economic approach to the question than has been taken thus far. Do the 
actions of the FOMC have any predictable effect on the market or will investor 
expectations have anticipated FOMC actions to such an extent that only an unexpected 
move produces an anomaly? 
The efficient market hypothesis, first documented in the 1960's by Eugene Fama, 
describes market forces: “In an 'efficient' market, competition among the many intelligent 
participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual 
securities already reflect the effects of information based both on events that have already 
occurred and on events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future.” 
(Fama 75) It is of macroeconomic forces that Mr. Fama speaks. His theory talks about 
large numbers of 'rational, profit maximizers' competing in markets flooded with various 
kinds of securities and bits of information too numerous to count. As a result of this 
activity, no single investor will be able to predict short run price volatility in order to 
achieve a return superior to that of a buy and hold investment strategy. In these markets 




The opposition contends this is not the case. As evidenced by Mr. Fama's own 
wording, one of the assumptions of an efficient market is competition between intelligent 
investors who react rationally to new events. In violation of this assumption, everyday 
experience suggests most investors do not make decisions based on pertinent facts or 
utilize sound judgment in their interpretation of market events. According to DeBondt 
and Thaler most people “tend to overreact to unexpected and dramatic news events” 
(804) producing identifiable anomalies that prove that market efficiency is irrelevant. For 
example, it has been suggested that the negative post-listing return behavior of stocks 
newly listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is attributable to investor 
overreaction. When a stock is released to the public, investors will overreact, biding the 
price of the stock up before the profit taking mechanism takes over and the price begins 
to fall. Another explanation or a coincident explanation suggested is the opportunistic 
listing of a stock prior to a period of poor performance. Another example of overreaction 
happens when a stock splits. When a stock splits it experiences long term positive 
abnormal returns both before and after the split. Another study combines the findings that 
company earnings do not vary enough to justify a stock’s price movements with the 
assertion that stock movements are strongly correlated with the following years’ earnings 
to suggest a pattern of overreaction. (DeBondt and Thaler 794). Numerous additional 
studies proclaim the existence of an over/under reaction induced anomaly that defies the 
logic of Fama's conclusions. 
In response to this line of reasoning, and separate from the theoretical assertion 
that no single inefficient market theory can account for all market anomalies, proponents 
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of market efficiency have produced thousands of research papers and empirical studies of 
individual security analyst’s earnings predictions and the performance records of mutual 
fund managers looking for evidence that any one individual can consistently beat a buy 
and hold strategy. Given the existence of the anomalies, there is no evidence that any 
individual has accomplished this feat.  
These studies and many more like them, focus on finding anomalous returns in a 
small sub-set of stocks, or in the track records of a limited number of professionals. They 
do not address the predictability of a system wide event. Therefore, this paper will 
conduct an event study using macro indicators and events in an attempt to find 
predictability at the market level. The model will utilize the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
(NASDAQ) index as the portfolio and the Standards & Poor 1200 (S&P) index as a 
worldwide indicator of market return. Market expectations of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) federal funds rate decisions will also be included in the model. It is 
expected that changes in the federal funds rate will produce a significant effect in the 
DJIA and NASDAQ indexes. Following Fama’s contention that even under proof of a 
market anomaly, the overreactions and under reactions will balance each other out 
upholding the theory of market efficiency, data from the futures market will be utilized to 
calculate market expectations and give a probability estimate of the actions of the FOMC. 
It is hypothesized that the inclusion of market expectations in the model will prove any 




The importance of this issue cannot be overstated. Predictability in financial 
markets is the marketing tool of thousands of professionals across the globe. Long Term 
Capital Management made billions of dollars in profit for it's clients by taking advantage 
of inconsistencies in various markets around the world. But, as it found out, once an 
inconsistency is discovered other players in the market will step in, take advantage of the 
inconsistency until it no longer exists. Therein lies the paradox of the financial anomaly. 
“If every investor believed a market was efficient, then the market would not be efficient 
because no one would analyze securities." (“EMH.” 2) In effect, markets depend on 
market participants who believe the market is inefficient and trade securities in an 
attempt to outperform the market.  
Aside from theoretical arguments and postulations, consider the numbers 
involved. In 1999, the New York Stock Exchange traded 262.5 billion shares amounting 
to more than 11 trillion dollars. On average, 1,041.6 million shares exchanged hands 
every day for a dollar value of 43.9 billion dollars. (“NYSE”) In the first 90 years of it’s 
existence, the Dow Jones Industrial Average gained a total of 1200 points. Today it is not 
unusual for the market to fluctuate by more than 300 points in a single day or one quarter 
of the gain made in roughly eighty-five years. If we proved that professional investment 
analysis was worthless, then thousands of analysts and investment prognosticators might 
see a decline in demand for their services. (Standard Industrial Classification code 62 
contains some of the biggest names in financial services; names like: The Charles 
Schwab Corporation, Daiwa Securities Group Inc, Merrill Lynch & Co and The Goldman 
Sachs Group.) It is a given improbability that any academic findings would be strong 
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enough to discredit an entire industry causing it to disappear. However, even small 
impacts can cause a ripple effect magnifying the damage. According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, (2000), Security and Commodity Brokers (SIC 62) created 117 billion dollars of 
GDP in 1997, this industry employed 675,000 people across 45,000 establishments and 
paid out 68.3 billion dollars in payroll. (507) 
The greatest potential beneficiary of this type of study would be the consumer of 
investment services. Investment strategies suggesting decisions based on some magical 
correlation have been prevalent since the dawn of securities market. A famous example 
being a system based on sun spot activity or one based on the length of the ladies’ skirts 
currently in fashion. Information regarding the profitability of these systems or any 
investment strategy that proclaims short-term, commission intensive investing as being 







As noted earlier, the central issue is efficiency. Eugene Fama defined an efficient 
market as “a market where there are large numbers of rational, profit maximizers actively 
competing, with each trying to predict future market values of individual securities, and 
where important current information is almost freely available to all participants.” 
(“EMH.” 1) Another way of stating this definition is to assert that an efficient market is 
informationally efficient. The mathematical model of the efficient market hypothesis is 
the random walk. The key feature of this series is that the value of ‘y’ today is highly 
correlated with ‘y’ in the future. The value of ‘y’ at time ‘t’ is obtained by starting at the 
previous value; yt-1 and adding a zero mean random variable, or a stochastic variable, that 
is independent of yt-1. In other words the value of a random walk does not depend on 
time, but the variance does. The variance of a random walk series increases as a linear 
function of time. It is a non-stationary, highly persistent series in the sense that the value 
of ‘y’ today is significant for determining the value of ‘y’ in the very near future but as 
you go further out in time, the variance of the series will increase without bound.  
 
if q = pt+1 - pt 
then 
E{q} = 0 
 
The random walk model of stock prices states that the net change in a stock price 
is, on average, equal to zero. Combining this with the informationally efficient 




E{q:It} = 0 
 
Where the variable 'I' represents the information available at time 't'. The expected 
value of a change in stock price given all the information available at that time is zero. 
Therefore, the expected value of a value of a stock one period into the future, given 
today's knowledge is the price today. 
 
E{pt+1:It} = pt 
or 
E{pt+s:It} = pt 
Or 
pt+1 = pt + ut 
 
The 'u' variable is a white noise term, meaning the variable (‘u’) has a mean of 
zero, a constant variance and is serially uncorrelated. Since the expected value of the 
price today is equal to the price of yesterday plus the value of the disturbance term, which 
is expected to be zero, the best guess of tomorrow's price is today's. One would guess 
from this explanation that the series would always revert to its mean value but it doesn't 
because all stochastic shocks to the system have a non-decaying effect. The problem with 
this model is the theoretical possibility that the stochastic shock could take on a large 
negative value causing the price of the stock to take on a nonsensical negative value. To 
alleviate this problem the rate of return from holding the stock one period is treated as the 
random variable. 
 
pt+1 = (1+rt) pt  
The expected price is then stated as: 




Efficient market theory and random walk theory implies that no knowledge of 
published information, either public or insider, can be used to purchase and sell stocks in 
such a way as to make a long run profit superior to that of a buy and hold strategy. When 
describing a financial process as a random walk, something extraordinary occurs. By 
invoking this phrase you place the well informed veteran investor on the same level with 
the casually informed investor, you nullify all of the knowledge, education and years of 
experience of numerous stock analysts and traders. If markets are ruled by a random 
walk, the rates of return on investments of the professional and the dabbler equate over 
the long run. For example, if you gave a professional and an amateur a sum of money and 
allowed the professionals to trade as he sees fit and instructed the amateur to select at 
random a portfolio of stocks, holding those stocks over a period of time, the amateur's 
rate of return, on average, would equal that of the professional. Numerous studies have 
been conducted pitting professional’s portfolio returns against the market and the results 
validate the efficient market theory. Burton Malkiel and John Craig performed a study of 
nineteen Wall Street firms’ past earning predictions of major companies over a one year 
and five year time period. When compared with the actual results, the earnings estimates 
were off by more than thirty percent. The earning estimates made by the New York heavy 
weights turned out to be no better than extrapolation of estimates from past trends. Even 
the use of a naïve-forecasting model, assuming that all companies’ earnings would enjoy 
a growth rate identical to that of the long run rate of growth in national income, faired 
better than the analyst's estimates. (Malkiel 169) The findings of Malkiel and Craig were 
later confirmed in a wider study done by Michael Sandretto and Sudhur Milkrishnamnrthi 
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who utilized a data set of “one thousand of the most widely followed companies, with 
estimates available from five or six analysts for each company found that the average 
annual error of the analyst was 31.3 percent over a five year period.” (Malkiel 170)  
The empirical results of studies carried out on the  predictions of market 
professionals do not prove the market to be efficient, they only show that professionals 
are unable to interpret the morass of data in such a way as to earn sustained superior 
returns. Even Fama, in his “Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral 
Finance” concedes that market participants will over-react to some types of news but at 
the same time he states that market participants will tend to under-react to certain other 
kinds of news. The anomalies affecting efficiency in the market are chance results. 
Apparent over-reaction to information is about as common as under-reaction, and post-
event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is about as frequent as post-event 
reversals (Fama 25). Apparent anomalies can also be due to the methodology used in the 
study, most long term return anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable changes in 
technique. Fama’s model is preferable to any alternative hypothesis put forth to date 
because it can account for all movement in the market. The market is composed of 
individuals assuming the market to be inefficient, forcing supply and demand to move in 
and eradicate discrepancies in price; yet if investors did not engage in this activity then 
the market would be inefficient. An anomaly might show the exception to the rule but 






One of the central assumptions of market efficiency has to do with investor 
behavior. The efficient market hypothesis assumes that investors will behave in a rational 
manner, yet everyday experience shows us that individuals, whether or not they are faced 
with an investment decision, do not behave in a rational fashion. Behavioral modifiers 
such as stress, fascination with magical correlations, hubris, trends and many other 
modifiers influence the decision making process just as they do every other decision 
made by humans. Several behavioral models have been put forth to try and explain the 
investor decision process. For example, Danile, Hirshleifer and Subramanyam argued 
that investors suffer from two biases: overconfidence and biased self-attribution. 
Overconfidence will lead an investor to exaggerate the precision of their private signals 
about a stock's value and biased self-attribution causes them to down weight public 
signals about value, especially when the public signals contradict their private signals. 
DeBondt and Thaler concluded that investment decisions follow a simpler pattern 
credited to Kahneman and Tversky that most people overreact to unexpected and 
dramatic news events (DeBondt and Thaler 795). 
The proof of the overreaction hypothesis is predictability. In an attempt to test 
whether the overreaction hypothesis is predictive, De Bondt and Thaler tested the 
anomaly that portfolios of loser stocks (stocks with a history of poor earnings 
performance) will tend to out-perform portfolios of winner stocks in the future. Armed 
with Lakonishok, Sheifer and Vishny’s argument that investors are surprised and tend to 
overreact when earnings growth mean reverts so that poor past performers become 
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winners and superior past performers become losers. DeBondt and Thaler tested the 
extent of association between nonzero return behavior before and after portfolio 
formation. Their data set focused on “stocks that have experienced either extreme capital 
gains or extreme losses over periods up to five years.” The study concluded that after 
portfolio formation, the losing stocks earned about 25% more than the winners, even 
though the later are significantly more risky (DeBondt and Thaler 804). Unfortunately, 
DeBondt and Thaler never classify the meaning of ‘extreme’ in reference to capital gains 
or losses. The study indicates that the overreaction is sustained; but, if the gains or losses 
were extreme enough, then by definition they would also be rare occurrences and largely 
unpredictable.  
Another way of looking at market inefficiency is to say that the lag in price 
response to an event is significant. Kleidon found that “stock price movements are 
strongly correlated with the following year’s earnings changes” (18). Even Keynes spoke 
of this phenomenon when he observed that: “day to day fluctuations in the profits of 
existing investments, which are obviously of an ephemeral and non-significant character, 
tend to have an altogether excessive, and even an absurd, influence on the market.”(Ch. 
12)  
The key to defeating market efficiency is the ability to predict the anomaly. If the 
market reacts differently, at different points in time to the same information, then the 
market is efficient. Even Fama concedes that the theory of market efficiency is a faulty 
description of price information, but when compared to the gross assumption of 
inefficiency, market efficiency is a better-specified model. Any alternative theory must 
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specify the modifiers that cause a person to overreact to new information. The alternative 
theory must specify why an individual reacts differently to new information based on the 
conditional modifiers that exist for the individual at the time of the decision. The same 
individual might react differently to the same stimulus at different points in time or he 
might react differently to two sets of information at the same time. 
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EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY (INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES) 
 
Event study methodology has been used extensively to search for evidence of 
abnormal returns in stock price data. For the purposes of this paper, an abnormal return 
will be defined as a rate of return exceeding returns of a broad market portfolio held for a 
specified period of time. The search for these abnormal returns using a market model is 
relatively straightforward. Basically you are comparing the market return on an 
investment or a portfolio (the dependent variable), against the retur n on a broader market 
index (the independent variable) while identifying a single or reoccurring event. Time 
series data is collected on the independent and dependent variables and the event periods 
are identified using a dummy variable. Douglas Lamdin used an event study to look for 
abnormal returns in response to a regulatory stimulus. The model used here, described in 
detail in the next section, will be based on Lamdin’s model. Lamdin specified three 
concerns in using this type of analysis. The first is the extent to which the findings can be 
interpreted as a true measure of the impact of the decision by the FOMC. The second 
concerns the use of event studies to evaluate opposing theories. And the third concerns 
the low power of the event study due to the period uncertainty problems (the five days 
following a decision) (Lamdin 13). 
This first problem defines the crux of the event study. In event studies, especially 
with the one being proposed here, the focus on immediate market reaction to an event 
essentially ties any reaction to that event, the reaction is assumed to be caused by the 
event when in fact it might be caused by something outside of the model. Instead of 
capturing the relationship between market indexes and the actions of the FOMC, we 
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might capture some unanticipated relationship between market indexes and some other 
variable. In the hours immediately following a decision, investors begin to speculate on 
the actions to take place at the next meeting. These expectations are reflected in the 
market in the form of a futures contract; the 30-day federal funds rate. As new 
unemployment data, inflation figures, exchange rates and a myriad of other data become 
available those expectations are altered. As the meeting passes, the actual impact of the 
decision takes it’s toll on the indexes; but, is the impact caused by the decision or some 
other impact that occurs simultaneously with the decision? Changing the federal funds 
rate has been used as a tool to steer the economy for the past decade. It is assumed that no 
other expected stimulus, as opposed to an unexpected stimulus such as a terrorist attack 
or the sudden collapse of a company due to fraud, is more important. It is further assumed 
that the use of more than eighty event periods throughout the event window will expose 
any chance spurious effects.  
“An event study examines the return (capital gains plus any dividend) during the 
“event window’ to determine whether these returns were abnormally positive or 
negative” (Lamdin 3). One of the main problems with event studies is the identification 
of event periods. It is difficult to identify a single date at which a regulatory change was 
first suggested as well as identifying the date at which the impact of the event ceases to 
be a factor. Without careful consideration by the analyst, it is conceivable that some event 
periods would go unnoticed and that some false reactions, reactions attributable to 
another source, would be included in the study. Because of this uncertainty, event studies 
suffer from the problem of low power in detecting an events impact. Low power tests 
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“will cause the analyst to conclude that an event did not have any impact, though in fact it 
did (a Type II error). Looked at in a more positive light, if an event is found to have had 
an effect, this finding emerged in spite of a low power test conspiring against it” (Lamdin 
17). Unlike the event studies carried out by Lamdin, the event window in this study is 
easily definable. It could be argued that market anticipation and subsequent discounting 
of a FOMC action might make precise identification of the event window difficult. The 
inclusion of the federal funds futures market should account for any discounting that has 
occurred in anticipation of the decision. “Event period uncertainty causes tests to be less 
powerful in rejecting the hypothesis of no effect when the hypothesis is false in 
comparison to events with known dates” (Lamdin 13). For the purposes of this study the 
event window is February 1990 to March 2001. The event period is defined as the five 
days following a meeting of the FOMC. Beginning with the announcement of the 
committee’s decision and finishing with the closing bell of the NYSE five days later. For 
the purposes of this study it will be assumed that the pre-event activity will be captured 
by the inclusion of the futures’ contract price in the model. “If it is possible for the 
analyst to do so, events that were true surprises, or at least less likely to have been 
anticipated should be identified.” (Lamdin 17) The inclusion of the federal funds futures 
contract will serve, via a calculation, to identify unexpected event outcomes.  
Consideration must now be given to the last problem involved in using this 
model. Estimation of this model using ordinary least squares assumes that the error term 
has an independent and an identically normal distribution. Unfortunately, stock returns do 
not have this ideal distribution, potentially biasing the significance test. To account for 
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this problem the model will be estimated first using ordinary least squares methodology 
and then a robust regression methodology will be used and the results compared.  
The use of empirical evidence to analyze opposing theories rarely results in 
absolution. The confines of parsimony prohibit an exhaustive detail of any argument. 
This study suffers from several other problems. The methodology utilized suffers from 
low power due to period uncertainty. Identification of the start of the event is easily 
identified as the point at which an interest rate action is announced. Pre-event 
expectations are included in the model via the inclusion of the federal funds futures 
contract in the model. The end of the event period is also easily identified as the closing 
bell on the fifth day following the announcement. The effects of the decision on stock 
indexes could extend past the subjective period end date; this is the cause of ambiguity in 
the event periods of this study. According to Fama: “market efficiency must be tested 
jointly with a model for expected (normal) returns.” Although this model accounts for 
event expectations, it peripherally accounts for expected normal returns. This study 
models the DJIA and the NASDAQ reaction to an event. These two indexes are proxies 
for the normal market return of the American economy. A measure of world market 
return was included in the model but considering the size of the American economy in 
relation to the world market this inclusions contribution is questionable.  
It is not the intent of this study to decide the issue of efficiency in modern 
financial markets. The intent of this study is to offer some unique conclusions to add to 
the argument. It is a macro study in that the event is unarguably a macro stimulus and it’s 
effect is measured against broad market indexes. If the dummy variables measuring event 
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impact were to prove significant, the implication of inefficiency would be harder to refute 
than an anomaly observed as a result of a stock tender or a merger announcement. The 
purpose is to search for predictability. 
 
Federal Funds  
Investors as a whole have expectations regarding the course of future events and 
those expectations result in individual behaviors. These decisions, repeated thousands of 
times a second, are what move the market system around. The problem is in quantifying 
these expectations. In the case of a change in the federal funds rate, expectations are 
quantified in terms of a derivative security; the 30-day fed funds rate.  
Thus we have a stimulus, an action or inaction by the FOMC, a quantification of 
the expectations of the market participants concerning this stimulus, and a historical 
record of the effects of this stimulus on the NYSE. In simplistic terms, the FOMC has 
five choices. It can raise or lower the federal funds rate by a half point or a quarter point 
or it can leave it unchanged. Arguably it has many more choices than these simple five, it 
can raise or lower the rate by more than a half point, say by three quarters of a point or a 
whole point. The FOMC can also modify their decision by way of a statement about the 
future actions of the FOMC released after the meeting but in this analysis we will restrict 
the body’s choices to these five.  
Financial futures were first traded in 1975. This trading of a standardized 
derivative security is designed to shift market risk in the face of interest rate volatility to a 
third party. The expectations hypothesis "suggests that the present price of a futures 
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contract represents the market's consensus expectation of the future spot price" (Van 
Horne 150). According to this theory, the price of a futures contract conveys expectations 
about the spot, or actual, price to prevail in the future. There is some argument, or 
question, on whether or not these futures contracts are biased estimates of the future spot 
price. John Maynard Keynes put forth the theory of normal backwardization, and implied 
that in order to transfer risk from the hedgers to the speculators, a price concession must 
be made. Therefore Keynes's theory states that the price of a futures contract must be less 
than the expected future spot market price, and as a result is a biased estimate. Normal 
contango theory states that reward must be offered to speculators to entice them into the 
market and therefore futures prices will be greater than the expected spot price. (Van 
Horne 150) In this instance we will make the assumption that the expectations hypothesis 
holds and futures prices in general are an unbiased estimate of expected spot prices.  
For illustrative purposes a brief explanation of a futures contract pricing to 
offered. There are many theoretical systems to pricing a futures contract, but according to 
the law of one price all of them will arrive at the same result. According to this law: "any 
financial asset or liability must have the same price regardless of the means by which it is 
created" (Van Horne 244). To illustrate the pricing of a futures contract consider the 
arbitrage model. In this model, the price of the futures contract is based on the price of a 
bond in the cash market, the coupon rate on the bond, and the interest rate for borrowing 
and settling until the settlement date. Suppose that we have a 20-year, 100 par value bond 
with a coupon rate of 12 percent, and it is selling at par value. Let us further suppose that 
this bond is the deliverable for a futures contract that settles in three months. If the 
18
 
current three-month interest rate at which funds can be loaned or borrowed is 8 percent 
per year, then there is some profit to be made. Suppose that the price of a futures contract 
is $1070. First we sell the futures contract at $1070, then we purchase a bond for $1000 
but we borrow the money to purchase the bond for three months at 8 percent per year. 
The borrowed funds are used to purchase the bond, resulting in no initial cash outlay for 
this strategy. Three months from now, the bond must be delivered to settle the futures 
contract and the loan must be repaid. Proceeds from the settlement of the futures contract 
would be $1070 plus $30 interest paid on the bond and the total outlay for repayment of 
the loan would be $1020 resulting in a profit of $80. Obviously, in a well- functioning 
market, arbitragers would buy and sell in such a way so as to eliminate this profit. They 
would buy the bond and sell the futures, forcing the futures price down and bidding up 
the bond price. In equilibrium, the theoretical futures price occurs where the profit from 
these trades are zero.  
Profit = F + CTP - (P + RTP) 
 
Where  
R = financing rate 
C = current yield, or coupon rate divided by the cash market price 
P = cash market price 
F = Futures price 
T = Time 
 
In equilibrium:  
 
0 =  F + CTP - (P + RTP) 
 
Solving for the theoretical futures price, we have: 
 




The theoretical futures price may be at a premium to the cash market price or at a 
discount from the cash market price depending on (R-C), or the net financing cost, more 
commonly known as the cost of carry. The important point is that futures contracts 
represent a consensus opinion on what the spot price will be in the future. 
This calculation allows one to assign an order of probability to the upcoming 
event (see the expectations probability table in the appendix). Theoretically, if the FOMC 
was to make its decision public and the market reacted in a predictable fashion we would 
reject market efficiency on a macro level. But if we were to prove that the predictability 
was due to a chance or unexpected  occurrence, then theory of market efficiency would 





Assumptions and Definitions 
The expectations hypothesis was assumed to be a valid theory in describing the 
relationship between the price of a futures contract and the eventual spot price. In direct 
contradiction of normal backwardization and normal contango theory, the price of a 30-
day federal funds futures contract was assumed to be an unbiased representation of the 
consensus expectations of the market regarding the decision of the FOMC. This 
assumption is necessary for the identification of ‘surprise’ decisions, decisions not 
anticipated by the market, as prescribed by Lamdin. The calculation of the market 
expectations indicator is a ratio of what the market expects versus the various possible 
outcomes. If this assumption were not valid, the identification of an unexpected outcome 
would be subject to an unknown bias and any conclusions based on the model would be 
suspect. It is further assumed that the dividing line between an expected outcome and an 
unexpected outcome occurs at 30 percent. So, if the FOMC were to leave rates 
unchanged but the market had factored in a 30 percent chance of a change, then an 
unexpected occurrence would be recorded. As an example, assume that the market has 
factored in a 70 percent chance that the FOMC would raise rates a quarter of a point and 
a 29 percent chance that the FOMC would raise rates a half a point. If the FOMC were to 
raise rates a quarter point then an expected outcome would be recorded. If however the 
FOMC raised the rates a half a point then an unexpected event would be recorded. It must 




Lastly, it was assumed that the S&P 1200 provided the best proxy for total market 
return. Arguably, the Wilshire 5000 index would have provided a more prosaic view of 
total market activity, but the index only measures the performance of all U. S. 
headquartered equity securities with readily available price data. Unlike the S&P1200 it 
does not contain an international component. Since the purpose of including a broad 
market index in the market model is to account for all other influences outside the event 
that is being studied, a global rather than a U.S. index would be preferred.  
The Model 
A standard approach to testing for abnormal returns is to use a modified version 
of the market model.  The market model relates the return on a stock or portfolio to the 
return on the entire market. Lamdin used this model to examine regulatory changes, 
specifically the deregulation of certain industries. He modifies the model and employs a 
dummy variable for the event period or periods that the analyst wishes to study:  
 
rt = a + ßrmt + GaDa +et 
 
rt = return on a security or portfolio during period t 
rmt = return on a representative market portfolio during period t 
Da = one or more dummy variables for the event period 
 
The model proposed by Lamdin will be the utilized to test the assertion that there 
is a market reaction to changes in the federal funds rate.  In this paper two models will be 
estimated. One model will test the effect of the decisions of the FOMC on the daily return 
of the NASDAQ and the second will test the effect of the decision on the NYSE. The 
representative market portfolio will be the daily return on the S&P 1200 index. Five 
dummy variables representing each of the five days following a decision will be 
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constructed. Each will equal one for a day in which a decision is released or a specified 
day following the release of the decision, and zero otherwise. The data set will cover the 
daily return on the indexes for an eleven-year period starting February 1991 and 
concluding January 2002.  
The following model will be estimate and the results reported: 
 
Dow Jones Industrial Model 
 
rt = ßrmt + G1aD1a + G2aD2a + G3 aD3a + G4aD4a + G5 aD5a + daEa +et 
 
rt = daily return on Dow Jones Industrial Average 
rmt = daily return on the S&P1200 index  
D1a = dummy variable for day after announcement  
D2a = dummy variable for day 2 after announcement  
D3a = dummy variable for day 3 after announcement  
D4a = dummy variable for day 4 after announcement  
D5a = dummy variable for day 5 after announcement  
Ea  =  dummy variable indicating market expectations 
 
Ho: ß = G1 = G2 = G3 = G4 = G5 =d = 0 




rt = ßrmt + G1aD1a + G2aD2a + G3 aD3a + G4aD4a + G5 aD5a + daEa +et 
 
rt = daily return on NASDAQ 
rmt = daily return on the S&P1200 index  
D1a = dummy variable for day after announcement  
D2a = dummy variable for day 2 after announcement  
D3a = dummy variable for day 3 after announcement  
D4a = dummy variable for day 4 after announcement  
D5a = dummy variable for day 5 after announcement  
Ea  = dummy variable indicating market expectations 
 
Ho: ß = G1 = G2 = G3 = G4 = G5 =d = 0 




It is the expectation of this study that any anomalies found will be explained by 
the market expectations, that is any superior return recorded on a decision day will be the 
result of the FOMC reacting in a fashion that was unexpected. For each event, or decision 
an expectation probability indicating the most likely outcome of the event will be 
assigned. If the decision of the FOMC does not coincide with the market’s expectation 
probability indicator, then the sixth dummy variable, representing market expectations, 
will equal one. If the event outcome coincides with the expectation probability indicator 
then the dummy variable will equal zero. A table of event specific expectation probability 
indicators is given in the appendix.  
Originally the two models, one containing the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
event reaction and one containing the NASDAQ event reaction, were estimated using 
ordinary least squares methodology. The specific data set being modeled here suffers 
from one significant violation of the assumptions of ordinary least squares, the 
assumption of heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity refers to unequal variance in the 
residuals. This causes the model coefficients to be inefficient and it affects the test for 
significance. In addition to the problem of heteroskedasticity this data set contains 
numerous outliers. Outliers violate the assumption of normally distributed residuals in 
least squares regression. They tend to pull the least squares fit too much in their direction 
by receiving much more “weight” than they deserve. Typically, you would expect that 




To combat the effect of these two violations, both models will be estimated 
utilizing ordinary least squares methodology and then re-estimated using robust 
regression methodology and the results compared. Robust regression allows for the 
correct weighting of outlier data points, reducing their effect on the regression 
coefficients. Robust regression utilizes a type of maximum likelihood to minimize the 
sum of the residuals. The method repeatedly estimates the model’s coefficients and 
through an iterative process the coefficients are calculated until the sum of the residuals is 
at a minimum. This method of robust regression is well suited to deal with the problem of 
heteroskedasticity. By allowing the user to select the variable that weights the outliers a 
correction variable, the inverse of the logarithmic square of the ordinary least squares 
residuals can be calculated correcting the problem. The assumptions and limitations of 
robust regression are the same as those of the multiple regression models, with one 
exception. The weights of individual data points must be scrutinized because it is possible 
that the influence of some of the observations could be substantially reduced or 





Of the nine variables, seven independent variables and two dependent variables, 
only three of them are continuous. Descriptive statistics were calculated on all three non-
binary variables and all three were found to exhibit normal distributions. Although none 
of the distributions exhibit any skewness, the market return for the S&P1200, the return 
for the DJIA and the return for the NASDAQ index are all strongly leptokurtic with 
kurtosis readings of 7.313, 9.364 and 17.918 respectively. This finding suggests that the 
daily return data for the three index portfolios are tightly centered on their mean. All 
normality tests supported by NCSS rejected normality for each non-binary variable at 
probability levels approaching zero.  
The daily return data of the S&P1200 is highly clustered around zero with a mean 
of -.000353 and standard deviation of .0074 (95% confidence interval covers -.01093 to 
.007047) with a range of almost 10 percentage points. The NASDAQ mean proves to be 
very small at: -.000200498 with a standard deviation of .01314 (95% confidence interval 
covers -.0132 to .0128) with a range of 25 percentage points. Unlike the S&P1200 and 
the NASDAQ index, the mean for the DIJA is a positive number equaling .000392 (95% 
confidence interval covers -.007608 to .008392) with a range of 11%. The evidence of a 
zero expected mean and a variance of that mean that increases as a function of time bear 
out the expectations predicted by random walk theory.  
A certain amount of correlation between the independent and dependent variables 




Table 1: Correlation Report 
 
Pearson Correlations Section
S & P 1200 DJIA NASDAQ
S & P 1200 1.00000 -0.59736 -0.53614
DJIA -0.59736 1.00000 0.55814
NASDAQ -0.53614 0.55814 1.00000
These negative relationships are graphically depicted in the scatter plots of the S&P 1200 
against the DJIA and NASDAQ in the appendix. Given as a point of reference the 
correlation between the market return of the NASDAQ and the NYSE is 0.558136. It is 
conceivable that the negative relationship between the two domestic market indexes and 
the more global S&P 1200 when compared to the positive correlation coefficients 
between the domestic indexes is due to the more global nature of the later index.  
The scatterplots of each independent variable against the dependent variable 
exhibits the linear trend that exists between each of the variables. These scatterplots also 
show the existence of numerous outliers in the data set. This problem is exhibited clearly 
in the box-whisker graphics that follow. The existence of these outliers and their effect on 
the significance of the parameter estimates will be dealt with using robust regression to 
estimate the purposed models. 
Following the methodology for robust regression, the first step is to estimate the 
models using ordinary least squares (OLS) methodology. For the purposes of this study 
the signs of coefficients are of secondary importance. All significant coefficients are 
important because they represent the effect the event has on the market. However, the 
S&P variable is expected to be positive in both models. The DJIA, the NASDAQ and the 
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S&P 1200 have had more days of growth then decline and it is expected that market 
indicators would move together. Significant dummy variables can be either positive or 
negative. It is conceivable that the market might react positively to an unexpected FOMC 
decision until market participants begin to engage in profit taking after which the effect 
would be negative. The OLS model for the DJIA shows that the market return for the 
S&P1200 was highly significant and that the dummy variable for the day following the 
announcement showed a mildly significant effect with a T - value of 2.8754 and a 
probability level of .004066. The OLS model for the NASDAQ shows that the S&P1200 
variable is again highly significant and that the market expectations variable is marginally 
significant with a T – value of 2.0475 and a probability level of .040700.  
Unlike most studies involving time series data, autocorrelation or serial 
correlation among the residuals proved to be largely nonexistent. Although the data sets 
used in this study are continuous time series data sets, the data points have been 
transformed. The original data set collected consisted of daily readings; opening and 
closing readings of the three indexes. This data set was then used to calculate daily 
market return on the index.  
To test for the presence of heteroskedasticity, the predicted values of each model 
are regressed on the residuals of the model. If the residuals variable is found to be 
significant then the model suffers from heteroskedasticity. The regression of the residuals 
on the predicted OLS dependent variable produces insignificant results. The DJIA and 
the NASDAQ model show significant T – values of –1.27 and –1.32 with probability 
levels of .202 and 0.18 respectively. (Although the OLS models do not show any 
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indication of heteroskedasticity, the NASDAQ robust regression of the absolute values of 
the residuals on the predicted values show heteroskedasticity.) Because of the possible 
presence of heteroskedasticity and the numerous outliers the above models must be 
estimated using the robust regression described earlier and a weighting variable. The 
calculation of the weighting variable is:  
 
(1) Estimation of equation using ordinary least squares methodology 
(2) Take residuals from step one and calculate log (µ²) 
(3) Regress log (µ²) on the independent variables of the model and obtain the 
fitted values: g 
(4) Exponentiate the fitted values: g to get: h: h = exp(g) 
(5) Estimate equation using robust regression and h = 1/g as the weighting 
variable 
 
As expected the robust regression produces results that are significantly different 
from the ordinary least squares estimation. As stated previously, it is not the sign of the 
coefficient that is important but the significance of the dummy variables this is of 
interests. It is expected that the signs of the coefficients in robust regression would be the 
same as those in OLS regression. As with OLS estimation, both models have a highly 
significant S&P1200 variable. The robust regression using the DJIA as the dependent 
variable finds that not only is the dummy variable for the day following the 
announcement significant but that the ‘day two’ and ‘day three’ dummy variables are also 
significant with T – values of 4.4816, 2.3799 and –2.0178 with probability levels of 
.0000008, .017382 and .043710 respectably. It should be noted that at 95% the ‘day 
three’ dummy variable is significant but if that level were changed to 99% that variable 
would prove insignificant. The r-squared statistic for this model indicates that almost 
50% of the variability in the dependent variable is explained. For the NASDAQ model, 
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the change from OLS to robust regression shows the market expectations variable 
becoming insignificant but the ‘day five’ dummy variable becomes significant with a T 
value of –2.9551 and a probability level of .003153. The r-squared statistic is similar in 
value to the DJIA statistic and shows that roughly 50% of the variability in the dependent 
variable is explained. Like the ordinary least squares estimation, the residuals still form a 
non-normal distribution, with the kurtosis of the residuals showing a highly leptokurtic 
distribution centered on zero. The DJIA model residuals and the NASDAQ model 
residuals have kurtosis readings of 6.42882 and 20.39107. The regression of the absolute 
value of the residuals produced in robust regression on the fitted ‘Y’ values indicates that 
the heteroskedasticity in the model has been alleviated or eliminated. The regression of 
the fitted ‘Y’ values on the absolute value of the residuals for the DIJA model is 
insignificant with a T – value of –1.3295 and a probability value of .183789. The 
regression of the fitted ‘Y’ values on the absolute value of the residuals for the NASDAQ 
model proves to be significant but only slightly. The T – value equals –2.3714 with a 
probability level of .017787. Again, if we were to rerun the estimation at 99% the 
NASDAQ regression of fitted values on the residuals would prove insignificant.  
The results of this analysis indicated that there is some form of anomaly present. 
Of the two models presented, the DJIA model conforms more to the expectations and the 
theory of market efficiency. You have an event that lasts three days and then becomes 
insignificant. The effect of the event has a diminishing effect on the market return of the 
index as time goes on. The coefficients decrease from a .17% change on the day after to a 
.07% change in market return on the third day. The NASDAQ model does not conform as 
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nicely to the market expectations. If the results of this study are accepted, then the 
conclusion is that the effect of the event is not felt until the fifth day after an 
announcement. Given these results, an initial conclusion might be that the results indicate 
a denial of market efficiency. If the NASDAQ reaction actually occurred five days after 
the event then the quick response tenet of market efficiency would be violated. Market 
efficiency states that the lag in the response of the market to an event must be short 
enough to prevent profitable investing based on predictability. The existence of an effect 
on the fifth day might be an anomaly inherent to this particular data set. Since the event 
period identified in this study ends on the fifth day following an event it is unknown if 
the reaction extends beyond the end of the study period. A further course of study might 
be to see just how far out the effects of the NASDAQ model continue after the fifth day.  
The real surprise is the insignificance of the market expectations variable. In both 
cases of robust regression, the variable that indicates when a surprise move by the FOMC 
has taken place, perhaps the greatest cause for volatility, has proven insignificant. This 
does not prove that the market is inefficient or that the market is rarely surprised by the 
policy making body. The market expectations variable was subject to some human 
decision-making and therefore is no t completely derived from the market but is 
subjective in nature. The assignment of an event as either an unexpected or expected 
outcome was made on the assumption that if the market was factoring in a 30 percent 
chance of a certain movement and that factoring proved correct then the event was 
anticipated by the market. It was expected that this study would produce an identifiable 
anomaly. It was further hypothesized that the anomaly would be explained as the 
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occurrence of a surprise movement by a policy setting body. Given the derived definition 








Caution must be taken when applying any single study to a macro theoretical 
argument. As stated, this study did not seek to define financial markets as efficient or 
inefficient. It merely sought to identify one more anomaly and present its evidence as part 
of the whole of the research done on the subject.  
One of the main drawbacks to this particular study exists in the market 
expectations dummy variable. Since a precedent study could not be found a subjective 
choice was made: the choice of 30 percent as the dividing line between an expected 
outcome and an unexpected outcome. A further course of analysis might be the 
estimation of these models using different percentages as the guide for decision-making. 
The model could be re-estimated at given percentage intervals (intervals of 1, 2 or 2.5 
percentage points) with the market expectations threshold starting at 25 percent and 
ending at 65 percent. This variation would show the expectations threshold of the market. 
A second subjective choice was made in the designation of the end date of the event 
period as the fifth day following an announcement. The effect of the rate decision could 
extend beyond this chosen end date. Extending the ending date of the event period to the 
day before the FOMC makes its next announcement would not only eliminate this 
shortcoming.  
According to this study there is an anomalous reaction by broad market indexes to 
the decisions of the FOMC that cannot be explained by chance or randomness. Whether 
this is the result of the subjective manipulation of a market expectations indicator, a 
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problem in the data itself or simply the shortcomings of the particular methodology used 
in this study remains unanswered.  
Happily, for the investment professional, there is some predictability in the 
market. Clearly, the potential reward to the investor who finds and successfully exploits 
an anomaly is limitless but there is not enough evidence to warrant rejection of market 
efficiency. No single study will be able to decide this issue; even considering the 
compelling weight of numerous studies done over time it is unlikely a consensus opinion 




S&P Global 1200: Description  
The S&P Global 1200 sets a new standard for global equity benchmarks. The S&P 
Global 1200 combines the features of a broad global portfolio with sufficient liquidity in 
the underlying equities, making the index ideally suited for index-related investment 
products. The S&P Global 1200 is the world's first real-time, free-float weighted index. 
The S&P Global 1200 covers approximately 70% of global market capitalization.  
The S&P Global 1200 is comprised of six regional indices: S&P 500, S&P/TSE 60 
(Canada), S&P Latin America 40, S&P/TOPIX 150 (Japan), S&P Asia Pacific 100 and 
S&P Europe 350. Constituents for each index are selected to ensure sectoral and, when 
applicable, country balance. Constituent weights are determined by a company's free-
float market capitalization. Free-float means that we remove corporate cross-holdings, 
government ownership, strategic holders and foreign investment restrictions.  
Defining the S&P Global 1200 
The S&P Global 1200 Index is comprised of six distinct, regional, component indices: 
US - S&P 500, Canada - S&P/TSE 60, S&P Latin America 40, Japan - S&P/TOPIX 150, 
S&P Asia Pacific 100, and the S&P Europe 350. The S&P Global 1200 represents the 
opportunity set of investable equities around the globe. Each regional benchmark is 
constructed in a similar manner to the S&P 500 with the addition of a float-adjustment 
factor. The size of each region corresponds to its relative size in the global equity market 
based on adjusted market value. The S&P Global 1200 is the first global index to be 
calculated in real time.  
Float-Adjusted Market value: When calculating index weights, individual constituents' 
shares held by governments, corporations, strategic partners, or other control groups are 
excluded from the company's shares outstanding. Shares owned by other companies are 
also excluded regardless of whether they are index constituents.  
In countries with regulated environments, where a foreign investment limit exists at the 
sector or company level, the constituent's weight will reflect either the foreign investment 
limit or the percentage float, whichever is the more restrictive.  
Liquidity: Stocks are ranked according to liquidity measured by dollar value traded. 
Value traded and float turnover are also analyzed on a monthly basis to ensure ample 
liquidity.  
Sector Classification: Standard & Poor's has mapped stocks to the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS). The S&P Global 1200 index provides geographic and 
economic balance over the 10 GICS market sectors. These sectors, consistent throughout 
all the S&P indices, include Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, 
Financials, Health Care, Industrials, Information Technology, Materials, Telcom 
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Services, and Utilities. Standard & Poor's classifies a stock according to the source of its 
largest revenue share.  
Fundamental Analysis: The financial and operating condition of a company are 
rigorously analyzed. Keeping in mind the goal of minimizing index turnover, the 
financial stability of index constituents is a major consideration.  
Revisions to the Float Adjustments: Once a year, the float adjustments will be reviewed. 
Each company's financial statements will be used to update the major shareholders' 
ownership.  
Quarterly Index Rebalancing: Changes in the number of shares outstanding driven by 
corporate events such as stock dividends, splits, and rights issues will be adjusted on the 
ex-date. Share changes of 5% or greater are implemented when they occur. All share 
changes of less than 5% are updated on a quarterly basis (third Friday of March, June, 
September, and December or at the close of the expiry of futures contracts). Imple-
mentation of new additions, deletions, and changes to the float adjustment, due to 
corporate actions, will be made available at the close of the third Friday in March, June, 
September and December. Generally, index changes, due to rebalancing, are announced 
10 days before the effective date by way of a news release posted on www.spglobal.com.  
Real-Time Calculation 
The S&P Global 1200 calculation begins as soon as the first quote for any index 
constituent is received. The index is calculated until 5:15pm ET to allow for last minute 
revisions by regional stock exchanges that are the last to close (U.S., Canada, and 
Mexico).  
At the country level, the opening price is the first trade of any stock, in the event a stock 
does not open the previous closing price or adjusted price in the region will be used. The 
closing index value is calculated using the closing price of each stock in its primary 
market.  





Federal Funds Rate 
 
The owner of a federal funds futures contract is obliged to take delivery of the 
interest paid on a principal amount of $5 million overnight fed funds held for 30 days. 
The price of the contract, called a 30-Day Fed Funds Futures, is equal to 100 minus the 
average federal funds rate during the contract month. The calculation of the market 
expectations probability indicator (see table in appendix) is a ratio of market expectations 
to possible outcomes. For example, a 4.50 percent rate equals 95.50 the price of these 
contracts implies expectations for the fed funds rate. For example, suppose the fed funds 
rate is currently 8.5% and next months fed funds futures contract is trading at 91.46. The 
price implies an average fed funds rate during the month of 8.54%. Also suppose that the 
Fed meets on the 20th of the contract month, a 30-day month. If at it’s meeting the Fed 
raises the fed funds rate from 8.5% to 8.75%, the average rate for the month would be 
8.58%. 
The calculation is as follows for possible outcomes is:  
 
(8.5% * 20 days) + (8.75% * 10 days) / 30 days = (170% + 87.5%)/30  = 167.50% / 30 = 8.58% 
The key point here is that a 25-basis point rate hike by the Fed would produce an 
average fed funds rate for the month just 8 basis points higher than the current rate of 8.5 
percent. So a fed funds futures contract pricing in an average rate of 8.54 percent for the 
month is pricing in 4 of the 8 basis points by which the average rate would rise in the 
event of a 25 basis point hike. Because 4/8 = 50 percent, we say the contract is pricing in 
a 50 percent chance of a rate hike. 
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Expectations Probability Table 
 Meeting Greenspan Decision Calculation of Probability Surprise 
Date Pre Post Change Plus 50 Plus 25 Minus 50 Minus 25 Dummy 
3/20/01 5.50 5.00 -0.05     51.2727% 102.5455% 0 
1/31/01 6.00 5.50 -0.05     8.0000% 16.0000% 1 
1/3/01 6.50 6.00 -0.05     27.9643% 55.9286% 1 
12/19/00 6.50 6.50 0.00     8.6667% 17.3333% 0 
11/16/00 6.50 6.50 0.00 3.2143% 6.4286%     0 
10/4/00 6.50 6.50 0.00 93.333% 186.6667%     1 
8/23/00 6.50 6.50 0.00     1.1250% 2.2500% 0 
6/29/00 6.50 6.50 0.00 6.0000% 12.0000%     0 
5/17/00 6.00 6.50 0.50 49.285% 98.5714%     0 
3/22/00 5.75 6.00 0.25 23.333% 46.6667%     0 
2/2/00 5.50 5.75 0.25     11.4231% 22.8462% 1 
12/21/99 5.50 5.50 0.00     14.3000% 28.6000% 0 
11/16/99 5.25 5.50 0.25 20.357% 40.7143%     0 
10/5/99 5.25 5.25 0.00 9.3462% 18.6923%     0 
8/24/99 5.00 5.25 0.25 13.714% 27.4286%     1 
6/30/99 4.75 5.00 0.25 12.000% 24.0000%     1 
5/18/99 4.75 4.75 0.00 9.6923% 19.3846%     0 
3/30/99 4.75 4.75 0.00 26.000% 52.0000%     1 
2/3/99 4.75 4.75 0.00     5.2000% 10.4000% 0 
12/22/98 4.75 4.75 0.00 15.555% 31.1111%     0 
11/17/98 5.00 4.75 -0.25     15.0769% 30.1538% 0 
10/15/98 5.25 5.00 -0.25     11.6875% 23.3750% 1 
9/29/98 5.50 5.25 -0.25     2.0000% 4.0000% 1 
8/18/98 5.50 5.50 0.00 6.4615% 12.9231%     0 
7/1/98 5.50 5.50 0.00 4.1333% 8.2667%     0 
5/19/98 5.50 5.50 0.00     0.0000% 0.0000% 0 
3/31/98 5.50 5.50 0.00 4.0000% 8.0000%     0 
2/4/98 5.50 5.50 0.00     5.2083% 10.4167% 0 
12/16/97 5.50 5.50 0.00 19.200% 38.4000%     1 
11/12/97 5.50 5.50 0.00 14.777% 29.5556%     0 
9/30/97 5.50 5.50 0.00 24.000% 48.0000%     1 
8/19/97 5.50 5.50 0.00 3.2500% 6.5000%     0 
7/2/97 5.50 5.50 0.00 10.344% 20.6897%     0 
5/20/97 5.50 5.50 0.00 12.000% 24.0000%     0 
3/25/97 5.25 5.50 0.25 18.667% 37.3333%     0 
2/5/97 5.25 5.25 0.00 8.3478% 16.6957%     0 
12/17/96 5.25 5.25 0.00 24.649% 49.2857%     1 
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11/13/96 5.25 5.25 0.00 7.4118% 14.8235%     0 
9/24/96 5.25 5.25 0.00 14.000% 28.0000%     0 
8/20/96 5.25 5.25 0.00 3.2727% 6.5455%     0 
7/3/96 5.25 5.25 0.00 29.000% 58.0000%     1 
5/21/96 5.25 5.25 0.00     1.1000% 2.2000% 0 
3/26/96 5.25 5.25 0.00 27.600% 55.2000%     1 
1/31/96 5.50 5.25 -0.25 30.000% 60.0000%     1 
12/19/95 5.75 5.50 -0.25     2.1667% 4.3333% 1 
11/15/95 5.75 5.75 0.00     7.4667% 14.9333% 0 
9/26/95 5.75 5.75 0.00     0.0000% 0.0000% 0 
8/22/95 5.75 5.75 0.00     2.2222% 4.4444% 0 
7/6/95 6.00 5.75 -0.25     29.1200% 58.2400% 0 
5/23/95 6.00 6.00 0.00 2.2500% 4.5000%     0 
3/28/95 6.00 6.00 0.00     8.0000% 16.0000% 0 
2/1/95 5.50 6.00 0.50 95.407% 190.8148%     0 
12/20/94 5.50 5.50 0.00 28.363% 56.7273%     1 
11/15/94 4.75 5.50 0.75 76.800% 153.6000%     0 
9/27/94 4.75 4.75 0.00 4.1176% 8.2353%     0 
8/16/94 4.25 4.75 0.50 40.533% 81.0667%     0 
7/6/94 4.25 4.25 0.00 33.280% 66.5600%     1 
5/17/94 3.75 4.25 0.50 40.714% 81.4286%     0 
4/18/94 3.50 3.75 0.25 13.000% 26.0000%     1 
3/22/94 3.25 3.50 0.25 20.000% 40.0000%     0 
2/4/94 3.00 3.25 0.25 35.416% 70.8333%     0 
12/21/93 3.00 3.00 0.00 6.6000% 13.2000%     0 
11/16/93 3.00 3.00 0.00 6.4286% 12.8571%     0 
9/23/93 3.00 3.00 0.00 16.000% 32.0000%     1 
8/17/93 3.00 3.00 0.00 12.857% 25.7143%     0 
7/7/93 3.00 3.00 0.00 8.3333% 16.6667%     0 
5/18/93 3.00 3.00 0.00     2.1538% 4.3077% 0 
3/23/93 3.00 3.00 0.00 15.750% 31.5000%     0 
2/3/93 3.00 3.00 0.00 12.480% 24.9600%     0 
12/22/92 3.00 3.00 0.00 13.333% 26.6667%     0 
11/17/92 3.00 3.00 0.00 10.769% 21.5385%     0 
10/6/92 3.00 3.00 0.00     12.4800% 24.9600% 0 
9/4/92 3.25 3.00 -0.25     8.3077% 16.6154% 1 
8/18/92 3.25 3.25 0.00 2.1538% 4.3077%     0 
7/2/92 3.75 3.25 -0.50     16.5517% 33.1034% 1 
5/19/92 3.75 3.75 0.00 10.833% 21.6667%     0 
4/9/92 4.00 3.75 -0.25     0.0000% 0.0000% 1 
3/31/92 4.00 4.00 0.00     0.0000% 0.0000% 0 
2/5/92 4.00 4.00 0.00     4.1667% 8.3333% 0 
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12/20/91 4.50 4.00 -0.50 24.000% 48.0000%     1 
12/6/91 4.75 4.50 -0.25     4.1600% 8.3200% 1 
11/6/91 5.00 4.75 -0.25     10.4167% 20.8333% 1 
10/31/91 5.25 5.00 -0.25     8.0000% 16.0000% 1 
9/13/91 5.50 5.25 -0.25     2.1176% 4.2353% 1 
8/6/91 5.75 5.50 -0.25     2.0800% 4.1600% 1 
7/3/91 5.75 5.75 0.00 29.000% 58.0000%     1 
5/14/91 5.75 5.75 0.00 4.2353% 8.4706%     0 
4/30/91 6.00 5.75 -0.25     28.0000% 56.0000% 0 
3/26/91 6.00 6.00 0.00 48.000% 96.0000%     1 
3/8/91 6.25 6.00 -0.25 18.782% 37.5652%     0 
2/1/91 6.75 6.25 -0.50     24.8889% 49.7778% 1 
1/9/91 7.00 6.75 -0.25     33.4545% 66.9091% 0 
12/18/90 7.25 7.00 -0.25 60.307% 120.6154%     1 
12/7/90 7.50 7.25 -0.25 39.583% 79.1667%     1 
11/13/90 7.75 7.50 -0.25 10.588% 21.1765%     1 
10/29/90 8.00 7.75 -0.25 21.000% 42.0000%     1 
10/2/90 8.00 8.00 0.00     18.6000% 37.2000% 1 
8/21/90 8.00 8.00 0.00 22.000% 44.0000%     1 
7/13/90 8.25 8.00 -0.25     4.2222% 8.4444% 1 
7/3/90 8.25 8.25 0.00     8.2857% 16.5714% 0 
5/15/90 8.25 8.25 0.00     2.1250% 4.2500% 0 
3/27/90 8.25 8.25 0.00 7.5000% 15.0000%     0 




NCSS Analysis Output 
Descriptive Statistics Report:S & P 1200 
Summary Section of MR1200 
Count Mean  Minimum Maximum  Range 
2807 -3.535777E-04 -4.995613E-02 5.003545E-02  9.999E-02 
 
Means Section of MR1200 
 
Parameter Mean  Median  Sum  
Value  -3.535777E-04 -5.140672E-04 -0.9924927  
Std Error  1.46099E-04   0.4101  
95% LCL  -6.399266E-04 -6.958229E-04 -1.796274  
95% UCL  -6.722886E-05 -3.015058E-04 -0.1887114  
T-Value   -2.4201 
Prob Level 0.015578 
Count   2807   
 
Skewness and Kurtosis Section of MR1200 
 
Parameter Skewness  Kurtosis 
Value  0.2016575  7.313138 
Std Error  0.2007883  0.7749611 
 
Normality Test Section of MR1200 
  Test  Prob  Decision 
Test Name Value  Level  Value (5%) 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.9544791 0.000000  Reject Normality 
Anderson-Darling 23.81435 0.000000  Reject Normality 
Martinez-Iglewicz 1.332041   Reject Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 6.355017E-02   Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Skewness 4.3304 0.000015   Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Kurtosis  16.7367 0.000000  Reject Normality 






























Descriptive Statistics: Dow Jones Industrial Average 
 
Summary Section of MRNYSE 
Count Mean  Minimum Maximum Range 
2807 3.921826E-04 -6.682758E-02 0.048424 0.1152516 
 
Means Section of MRNYSE 
 
Parameter Mean  Median Sum 
Value  3.921826E-04 3.905572E-04 1.100857 
Std Error  1.510284E-04  0.4239368  
95% LCL  9.617232E-05 1.685062E-04 0.2699557  
95% UCL  6.881929E-04 7.106946E-04 1.931757  
T-Value   2.5967 
Prob Level 0.009460 
Count   2807   
 
Skewness and Kurtosis Section of MRNYSE 
 
Parameter Skewness  Kurtosis 
Value  -0.5125272 9.36409 
Std Error  0.2881077  1.652837 
 
Normality Test Section of MRNYSE 
  Test  Prob  Decision 
Test Name Value  Level  (5%) 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.9405974 0.000000  Reject Normality 
Anderson-Darling 29.2746  0.000000  Reject Normality 
Martinez-Iglewicz 1.378598   Reject Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 6.652962E-02   Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Skewness -10.4949  0.000000  Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Kurtosis  19.3949  0.000000  Reject Normality 






























Descriptive Statistics: NASDAQ 
 
Summary Section of MRNASDAQ 
Count Mean  Minimum Maximum Range 
2807 -2.004987E-04 -8.957037E-02 0.1606211 0.2501915 
 
Means Section of MRNASDAQ 
 
Parameter  Mean   Median  Sum 
Value  2.004987E-04 5.538632E-04 -0.5627999 
Std Error  2.481505E-04  0.6965585  
95% LCL  -6.868648E-04 2.38781E-04 -1.928029  
95% UCL  2.858673E-04 9.270241E-04 0.8024296  
T-Value   -0.8080 
Prob Level 0.419175 
Count   2807 
 
Skewness and Kurtosis Section of MRNASDAQ 
 
Parameter Skewness  Kurtosis 
Value  0.3113253  17.91815 
Std Error  0.6718342  6.15386 
 
Normality Test Section of MRNASDAQ 
  Test  Prob  Decision 
Test Name Value  Level  (5%) 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.8650284 0.000000  Reject Normality 
Anderson-Darling 75.90972 0.000000  Reject Normality 
Martinez-Iglewicz 1.990831   Reject Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.109739   Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Skewness 6.5991  0.000000  Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Kurtosis  24.7868 0.000000  Reject Normality 








































































































Multiple Regression Reports: NASDAQ 
Descriptive Statistics Section 
    Standard 
Variable  Count Mean Deviation  
MR1200 2807 -3.535777E-04 7.740492E-03  
Suprise 2807 1.389384E-02 0.1170713  
MRNASDAQ 2807 -2.004987E-04 1.314729E-02  
 
 
Correlation Matrix Section 
 
 MR1200 Suprise MRNASDAQ 
MR1200 1.000000 -0.052073 -0.536140 
Suprise -0.052073 1.000000 0.065353 
MRNASDAQ -0.536140 0.065353 1.000000 
 
Regression Equation Section 
Independent  Regression Standard T-Value Prob 
Variable Coefficient Error (Ho: B=0) Level 
MR1200 -0.90439 2.7096E-02 -33.37 0.000 






Regression Coefficient Section 
Independent  Regression Standard Lower Upper 
Variable  Coefficient  Error 95% C.L.  95% C.L. 
MR1200 -0.9043956  2.709697E-02 -0.9575047 -0.8512865  












-0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2









Descriptive Summary Section of NASDAQ model residuals 
    Standard Standard 
Count Mean  Deviation Error  
2807 -5.709373E-04 0.0110873 2.092688E-04 
 
Means Section of red_NASDAQ 
 
Parameter Mean Median Sum 
Value -5.709373E-04 -9.89441E-05 -1.602621  
Std Error 2.092688E-04  0.5874175  
95% LCL -9.810965E-04 -4.616395E-04 -2.753938  
95% UCL -1.60778E-04 2.571548E-04 -0.4513037  
T-Value  -2.7282 
Prob Level 0.006407 
Count  2807 
 
 
Normality Test Section of red_NASDAQ 
 Test Prob  Decision 
Test Name Value Level   (5%) 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.8670993 0.000000   Reject Normality 
Anderson-Darling 67.47802 0.000000   Reject Normality 
Martinez-Iglewicz 1.91443    Reject Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 9.926774E-02    Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Skewness 13.5805 0.000000   Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Kurtosis  25.1224 0.000000   Reject Normality 









































Multiple Regression Reports: NYSE 
 
Descriptive Statistics Section 
   Standard 
Variable  Count  Mean Deviation 
MR1200 2807 -3.535777E-04 7.740492E-03  
Dummy1 2807 3.633773E-02 0.1871624  
MRNYSE 2807 3.921826E-04 8.001657E-03  
 
Correlation Matrix Section 
 
 MR1200 Dummy1 MRNYSE 
MR1200 1.000000 -0.035118 -0.597355 
Dummy1 -0.035118 1.000000 0.061065 
MRNYSE -0.597355 0.061065 1.000000 
 
Regression Equation Section 
Independent  Regression Standard T-Value Prob 
Variable  Coefficient  Error (Ho: B=0) Level 
MR1200 -0.6165949 1.563429E-02 -39.4386 0.000000 






Regression Coefficient Section 
Independent  Regression Standard Lower Upper 
Variable  Coefficient Error 95% C.L.  95% C.L. 
MR1200 -0.6165949 1.563429E-02 -0.6472375 -0.5859522 
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Descriptive Summary Section of NYSE model residuals 
  Standard Standard 
Count  Mean Deviation Error 
2807 1.077795E-04 6.409147E-03 1.209704E-04 
 
Means Section of red_NYSE 
 
Parameter Mean Median   Sum  
Value 1.077795E-04 3.203053E-05   0.302537  
Std Error 1.209704E-04    0.3395638  
95% LCL -1.293181E-04 -2.15355E-04   -0.362996  
95% UCL 3.44877E-04 2.606025E-04   0.9680699  
T-Value  0.8910 
Prob Level 0.373028 
Count  2807 
 
Normality Test Section of red_NYSE 
 Test Prob Decision 
Test Name Value Level (5%) 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.965424 0.000000 Reject Normality 
Anderson-Darling 16.37704 0.000000 Reject Normality 
Martinez-Iglewicz 1.267149  Reject Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 4.816442E-02 Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Skewness 0.1759 0.860391 Accept Normality 
D'Agostino Kurtosis  14.8062 0.000000 Reject Normality 






































Heteroskedasticity Tests: NASDAQ 
 
Descriptive Statistics Section 
   Standard 
Variable  Count Mean Deviation 
abs_resd_nasdaq 2807 7.142909E-03 8.481036E-03  
Yhat_NASDAQ 2807 3.704386E-04 7.035626E-03  
 
Correlation Matrix Section 
 
 abs_resd_nasdaq Yhat_NASDAQ 
abs_resd_nasdaq 1.000000 -0.077154 
Yhat_NASDAQ -0.077154 1.000000 
 
Regression Equation Section 
Independent Regression Standard T-Value  Prob 
Variable  Coefficient  Error (Ho: B=0)  Level  






Regression Coefficient Section 
Independent  Regression Standard Lower Upper 
Variable  Coefficient Error 95% C.L.  95% C.L. 
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Heteroskedasticity Tests: NYSE 
Descriptive Statistics Section 
    Standard 
Variable  Count Mean  Deviation  
abs_resd_nyse 2807 4.677778E-03  4.370352E-03 
yhat_NYSE 2807 2.844031E-04  4.796944E-03 
 
Correlation Matrix Section 
 
 abs_resd_nyse yhat_NYSE 
abs_resd_nyse 1.000000 -0.098758 
yhat_NYSE -0.098758 1.000000 
 
Regression Equation Section 
Independent  Regression Standard T-Value Prob  
Variable  Coefficient Error (Ho: B=0) Level  






Regression Coefficient Section 
Independent  Regression Standard Lower Upper  
Variable  Coefficient Error 95% C.L.  95% C.L.   












0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0










Heteroskedasticity Tests: Robust Regression – NASDAQ 
 
Descriptive Statistics Section 
   Standard 
Variable  Count Mean Deviation  
absrobust - red-nasdaq  2807 7.102104E-03 8.598566E-03  
Robust-Yhat-NASDAQ  2807 2.174616E-04 6.015468E-03  
 
 
Correlation Matrix Section 
 
 absrobust-red-nasdaq Robust-Yhat-NASDAQ 
absrobust - red-nasdaq 1.000000  -0.087918 
Robust-Yhat-NASDAQ -0.087918  1.000000 
 
Regression Equation Section 
 
Independent  Regression Standard T-Value  Prob  
Variable  Coefficient Error (Ho: B=O) Level  






Regression Coefficient  Section 
Independent  Regression Standard  
Variable  Coefficient Error  






Heteroskedasticity Tests: Robust Regression - NYSE 
Descriptive Statistics  Section 
        Standard 
Variable   Count  Mean   Deviation  
absrobust - red_nyse 2807  4.676051 E-03 4.389618E-03  
Robust-Yhat-NYSE 2807  2.732744E-04  4.461703E-03     
 
Correlation Matrix Section 
 
    absrobust-red-nyse  Robust-Yhat-NYSE 
absrobust - red_nyse  1.000000   -0.102000 
Robust-Yhat-NYSE  -0. 1 02000   1.000000 
 
Regression Equation Section 
Independent  Regression Standard T-Value  Prob  
Variable  Coefficient Error (Ho: B=O) Level  






Regression Coefficient Section 
Independent  Regression Standard  
Variable  Coefficient Error  






Robust Regression: NASDAQ 
Descriptive Statistics Section 
       Standard 
Variable  Count Mean  Deviation 
MR1200 2742 -7.508432E-04 5.530164E-03 
Dummy5 2742 3.536224E-02  0.1557994 
MRNASDAQ 2742 6.244903E-04  6.136645E-03 
 
Regression Equation Section 
Independent  Regression Standard T-Value Prob  
Variable  Coefficient  Error (Ho: B=0) Level  
MR1200 -0.7756441  1.507148E-02 -51.4643 0.000000  






Regression Coefficient Section 
Independent  Regression Standard Lower Upper  
Variable  Coefficient Error 95% C.L.  95% C.L.   
MR1200 -0.7756441 1.507148E-02 -0.8051836 -0.7461045  




























Descriptive Summary Section of NASDAQ Robust Regression Residuals 
  Standard Standard 
Count Mean Deviation Error  
2807 -4.179603E-04 1.114533E-02 2.103642E-04  
 
Means Section of Robust_red_NASDAQ 
 
Parameter Mean Median Sum 
Value -4.179603E-04 7.409741E-05 -1.173215  
Std Error 2.103642E-04  0.5904924  
95% LCL -8.302666E-04 -2.269426E-04 -2.330558  
95% UCL -5.65405E-06 4.25906E-04 -1.587092E-02  
T-Value  -1.9868 
Prob Level 0.047037 












Normality Test Section of Robust_red_NASDAQ 
 Test Prob  Decision 
Test Name Value Level  (5%) 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.8586966 0.000000   
Anderson-Darling 73.30135 0.000000   
Martinez-Iglewicz 1.98298   Reject Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.1025472   Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Skewness 14.1079 0.000000  Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Kurtosis  25.6663 0.000000  Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Omnibus  857.7927 0.000000  Reject Normality 
 


















Descriptive Statistics Section 
   Standard 
Variable  Count Mean Deviation 
MR1200 2787 -6.379405E-04 5.711995E-03 
Dummy1 2787 3.465883E-02 0.1552875 
Dummy2 2787 3.580637E-02 0.1577435 
Dummy3 2787 3.822644E-02 0.1627824 
MRNYSE 2787 4.92964E-04 4.673494E-03 
 
Regression Equation Section 
Independent  Regression Standard T-Value Prob  
Variable  Coefficient  Error (Ho: B=0) Level  
MR1200 -0.5721242 1.098187E-02 -52.0972 0.000000  
Dummy1 1.785587E-03 3.984272E-04 4.4816 0.000008  
Dummy2 9.328658E-04 3.9197E-04 2.3799 0.017382  







Regression Coefficient Section 
Independent  Regression Standard Lower Upper  
Variable  Coefficient Error 95% C.L.  95% C.L.   
MR1200 -0.5721242 1.098187E-02 -0.5936483 -0.5506001  
Dummy1 1.785587E-03 3.984272E-04 1.004684E-03 2.56649E-03  
Dummy2 9.328658E-04 3.9197E-04 1.646186E-04 1.701113E-03  


























Descriptive Summary Section of NYSE Robust Regression Residuals 
  Standard Standard 
Count Mean Deviation Error  
2807 1.189082E-04 6.413099E-03 1.21045E-04  
 
Means Section of Robust_red_NYSE 
    
Parameter Mean Median   Sum  
Value 1.189082E-04 1.475707E-04   0.3337754  
Std Error 1.21045E-04    0.3397732  
95% LCL -1.183355E-04 -1.482529E-04   -0.3321679  
95% UCL 3.56152E-04 3.377555E-04   0.9997187  
T-Value  0.9823 
Prob Level 0.326013 












Normality Test Section of Robust_red_NYSE 
 Test Prob  Decision 
Test Name Value Level  (5%) 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.9642898 0.000000  Reject Normality 
Anderson-Darling 16.7492 0.000000  Reject Normality 
Martinez-Iglewicz 1.270836   Reject Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 4.997937E-02   Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Skewness -0.7755 0.438065  Accept Normality 
D'Agostino Kurtosis  15.1552 0.000000  Reject Normality 
D'Agostino Omnibus  230.2809 0.000000  Reject Normality 
 

















Auto Correlation: NASDAQ 
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Significant if |Correlation|> 0.037749 
 























Auto Correlation: NYSE 
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Significant if |Correlation|> 0.037749 
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